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ABSTRACT 
FOOTING THE BILL:  
AN EMPIRICAL LOOK AT THE CORRELATIONS BETWEEN CAMPAIGN 
CONTRIBUTIONS AND COUNCILOR VOTES ON SPLIT TAX RATES IN 
MASSACHUSETTS. 
 
MAY 2020 
 
TRISTAN LALIBERTE 
 
B.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
 
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
 
Directed by: Professor Justin Gross 
 
 The current literature regarding the relationship between campaign contributions 
and roll call voting by elected officials has primarily focused on the congressional level. 
This study begins to fill the holes in this topic by utilizing city councilor contributions 
from likely business owners and their stance on tax classification in their respective 
communities. In this study, I examine contribution data from municipal officials in 
fourteen communities in Massachusetts as well as the expressed opinions made by city 
councilors in the 2018 tax classification hearings in order to test the theories that (1) there 
is a correlation between the actions of political elites and the interests of campaign 
contributors at the municipal level and (2) that municipal candidates heavily rely on 
contributions from the business community to finance their campaigns. Though the 
results are limited, the evidence suggests that if any relationship exists it is negligible and 
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unlikely to exist at any level that would validate concern. The findings also suggest that 
candidates for office in smaller municipalities are not as dependent on contributions from 
the business community as those in large cities or at the congressional level. 
Keywords: Massachusetts, tax classification, municipal, campaign contributions, 
municipal campaign donations, special interest contributions.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
A. Follow the Money 
“Follow the money.” This was the advice given by Henry Peterson to the Senate 
Judiciary Committee in 1974 (Doyle, Mieder, and Shapiro, 2012), to uncover instances of 
political corruption. Financial gain is the prime indicator, if not the root cause of what has 
been perceived to be corrupt practices by lawmakers. In fact, money itself has been 
described as the “tracer element” for the “distribution of political power” (Alexander and 
Corrado, 1995). The average American is unfortunately all too familiar with its 
implications associated with the role of money in the American political establishment. In 
the spirit of Peterson’s words, awareness of the financial operations of prominent public 
figures has risen dramatically since the 1970s, followed closely by a push for increased 
campaign finance restrictions. This should not be a surprising fact. If political corruption 
is indeed widespread, then it serves as a very real threat to the American Republic and 
would mean that governmental bodies can be easily influenced by those with access to 
capital. There is a copious amount of research regarding the correlation between 
campaign finance and legislative vote choice at the congressional level. Yet, however 
abundant research on the topic may be, it remains hindered by the field’s hyper focus on 
one body, of one branch, of one level of government within the United States. 
As Tip O’Neill famously stated, “All politics is local” (Matthews, 1999), and yet 
we see the attention of political scientists captured by large scale political institutions, 
leading to missing information in the area of government which most directly impacts the 
lives of the majority of Americans. The decisions made by municipal lawmakers can 
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have an immediate and direct impact on the day to day lives of individuals while the 
results of the highly publicized debates that rage in Washington remain hardly felt. 
Consider the Congressman from an urban district whose constituents will likely never 
notice the impacts of a farming subsidies bill that he cosponsored 200 miles away in 
relation to the local official that personally saw to it that the pothole on their constituents 
morning commute to work was filled. Despite this, the subject of interest in the political 
field has largely been centered on the federal government.  
The call for increased attention to the municipal level is as old as Lawrence 
Herson’s 1957 plea for “a revitalized study of American city government[s]” (Herson, 
1957).  By neglecting direct study of municipal actors, political scientists are left with 
two potential consequences: either theories developed at the federal and other levels of 
government are so well generalizable that they may be seamlessly transferred to 
municipal situations; or there are sizeable differences between local and other forms of 
government that prevent the transfer of theories. In either case, further empirical studies 
of municipal activities are necessary for the field to advance (Marschall, 2010; 
Trounstine, 2009; Holbrook and Weinschenk, 2014). By taking a closer look at what 
transpires at the local level, we can gain a more complete illustration of the political 
scene in American life. 
Now more than ever before the easy access to data makes empirical studies at 
such a level possible. This study takes advantage of this situation and seeks to find if a 
correlation exists between municipal elite action on tax classification and the percentages 
of campaign contributions made from business leaders within communities. I do not 
make the claim that these contributions necessarily have a causal relationship with 
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officials’ decisions to support friendly tax rates for businesses, rather I simply aim to 
discover if there is a discernible correlation between campaign contributions and vote 
choice, as has been recorded at the congressional and large scale cities, in smaller 
municipalities that typically go unstudied. I also attempt to find any discrepancies in the 
sourcing of campaign contributions between large cities that are typically the subject of 
scholarly study, and smaller municipalities that are left unchecked.  
B. Threats from Unregulated Campaign Finance 
In the minds of many Americans, the mention of money in the context of politics 
alone is enough to trigger colorful illustrations of party bosses committing morally 
heinous acts. Thoughts of corruption and greed coming from political figures, no matter 
how accurate or inaccurate they may be, are sure to permeate through the individuals’ 
subconscious or even conscious mind by the mere mention of money in politics. The 
classic image of a greedy politician is one that is commonly played out in various forms 
of American culture and entertainment. This long predates effective campaign finance 
reform that emerged in the 1970s as the word “corrupt” is not one that has ever been 
absent in American literature. In fact, it has consistently appeared at the same rate in 
printed texts since America’s founding (Michel, Jean-Baptiste et al. 2010). Worries 
surrounding alleged corruption have led to a number of attempts at campaign finance 
reform with an ever-increasing push to remove the ostensible influence of money over 
politics.  
The American public has developed such a negative view of the role of money in 
politics that a legitimate campaign strategy has evolved where candidates flaunt their 
financial independence from big donors and PACs or even go on the offensive by 
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attacking their opponents for accepting PAC contributions. The 2020 presidential 
campaign has been littered with instances of candidates attempting to distance themselves 
from wealthy contributors and special interest groups. Candidates on both sides of the 
aisle have touted their own personal wealth to establish their own independence from 
large campaign contributors, some have even pledged to only accept grass roots and 
small dollar campaign contributions. The Democratic National Committee itself has 
helped to foster this targeting of small dollar contributions by changing debate 
qualification requirements (Milligan, 2020). New guidelines established individual donor 
requirements that forced candidates to attract a large amount of very small campaign 
contributions. But what is this alleged influence that money has, and why should voters 
care to worry about it? And are these steps/actions necessary? 
Apart from a few outliers, who have the means to finance their own political 
ambitions, candidates for elected office require consistent donations to continue to 
campaign and, ultimately, maintain their ability to influence policy direction. According 
to Georgetown University, successful congressmen and women had to raise an average of 
over $1.5 million for their reelection bids (AN INSIDE LOOK AT CONGRESSIONAL 
FUNDRAISING, 2012). This translates to over $16,000 a week. Former Congressman 
David Jolly placed that figure significantly higher telling reporters that he was told he had 
to fundraise $18,000 per day for both himself and the party in order to secure re-election. 
Congressmen and women spend significant portions of their time in Washington calling 
potential contributors in party owned call centers near Capitol Hill (Selleck, 2016). A 
number of news stations have reported that congressmen spend nearly half of their 
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workday making calls in search of the necessary campaign contributions needed to fund 
their re-election campaigns and to support their political party. 
These extreme measures taken may be unique to congressional officeholders, but 
elected officials at all levels of government require continued financial support to, 
consistently and successfully, run for re-election. It should come as no surprise that while 
these essential funds can come from a number of sources, studies have suggested that the 
most common contributors are business owners, (Fleischman and Stein, 1998). While we 
often associate corporate sponsors with Washington politics, businesses and business 
owners have been found to be a primary source of these essential funds at the municipal 
level as well, contributing over 70% of councilor’s war chests (Fleischman and Stein, 
1998). Through his analysis of New York and London, Herbert Alexander found that 
over 80% of municipal campaign contributions came from businesses, with the majority 
of those businesses centered on development interests (Alexander 1991). This suggests 
that grass roots and small campaign contributions have historically not been strong 
enough to support the financial exhausting process of campaigning, even at the municipal 
level. This forces candidates for elected office to seek the necessary funds from sources 
that can reliably provide consistent financial assistance. It is through this dependence on 
financial support that we find the theorized threat to a republican form of government. 
There are two major concerns surrounding campaign finance and the health of a 
democracy. The first is that campaign contributions can tip the scales of an election in 
favor of the candidate who is able to spend the most money (Holbrook and Weinschenk, 
2014). In this case, the threat to democracy is not limited only to candidates who have 
their seats purchased through the financial endorsements of major Political Action 
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Committees, but also through the self-financed candidate who is able to spend their own 
personal fortune to ensure electoral victory (Steen, 2009). This very scenario is the topic 
of much debate now as multiple billionaires sought to win the Democratic nomination for 
President in the 2020 election. Senator John Pastore of Rhode Island once warned, on this 
very subject, that with no ceilings placed on spending of personal fortunes, “only the 
wealthy or those who are able to obtain large contributions from limited sources will be 
able to seek elective office”(Boatright, 2006). In this scenario, the threat to the republic 
lies in the inability of voters to accurately select which individual should represent them. 
Instead, the election’s outcome is predetermined by the campaign contributors and 
personal wealth of the candidates as they have the ability to provide the necessary funds 
to win the election. In all contested city council races in Los Angeles and Chicago 
between 1989 and 1999, 90% of elections went to the candidate that successfully 
fundraised the greatest amount (Krebs, 2001). Additional studies have claimed a strong 
link between campaign spending and vote share (Arrington and Ingalls, 1984; 
Fleischmann and Stein, 1998; Gierzynski, Kleppner, and Lewis, 1998; Poole, Romer, 
Rosenthal, 1987). This gives a significant advantage in the polls to the candidate that can 
raise the most money. 
The second fear regarding monetary influence, and the topic of interest in this 
paper, is that special interest groups can “buy” the votes of legislators. There has been 
evidence to suggest that a correlation exists between the political goals of campaign 
contributors and the voting records of congressmen (Roscoe and Jenkins, 2005). Though 
proving that this relationship is a causal one represents an additional layer of debate. The 
fear here is that a legislator may cast a vote in a direction preferable to one of their 
7 
 
contributors, when had it not been for that contributors’ donation, the legislator would 
have voted the other way. Though it has been argued that contributors are simply 
efficient at selecting candidates who will be sympathetic to their policy objectives, if 
campaign contributions increase the odds of electoral victory, as described above, a 
considerable threat of excessive influence over the political system from the wealthy 
remains plausible.  
Still, there are plenty who argue that direct vote buying takes place. Former 
Representative Downey of New York once stated “you can’t buy a congressman for 
$5,000 but you can buy his vote. It’s been done on a regular basis”, while former 
Representative Bill Brodhead stated very clearly that he believed “Votes are given in 
exchange for contributions” (Campaign Finance Reform, 1991).  Other representatives 
have testified on personal conversations in which congressional leaders admitted to 
giving in to their campaign contributors wishes.1 Additionally, a number of scholarly 
works have claimed to have proven some level of a causal relationship between 
contributions and vote choice (Roscoe and Jenkins, 2005). Nevertheless, even if either 
case were true, then unregulated campaign contributions truly would present a direct and 
very serious threat to the democratic process within the United States. 
 
1 Representative Dan Glickman “A member commented to me, ‘I am committed. I got a $10,000 check 
from the National Automobile’s Association. I can’t change my vote now.’” Representative Millicent 
Fenwick on remarks made to her by a colleague “‘I took $58,000, they want it,’ was the explanation 
one colleague gave me for his vote.”  See Campaign Finance Reform Proposals of 1983, Hearings Before 
the Committee on Rules and Administration, United States Senate, Ninety-eighth Congress, First Session, 
on the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, as Amended, and on Various Measures to Amend the Act, 
S. 85, S. 151, S. 732, S. 810, S. 1185, S. 1350, and S. 1684 : January 26, 27, May 17, and September 29, 
1983. 
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C. History of Campaign Finance Reform 
With the dramatic and very real threat that the power of financial strength 
potentially wields over the American Republic, efforts to limit the influence of the 
incredibly wealthy should be encouraged wherever and whenever possible. The study of 
campaign finance proliferated in the 1970’s (Michel et al, 2012) with the emergence of 
the Watergate scandal and a severe and deep mistrust of the government. Since then, 
campaign finance and campaign finance reform have remained a hot button issue that is 
periodically propelled to the forefront of modern political discourse. However, the 1970s 
did not mark the first-time campaign finance reform was discussed or tried in the United 
States. President Theodore Roosevelt pushed for disclosure of contributions to candidates 
at the federal level in his state of the union address in 1905 (State of The Union Address, 
1905). Initial legislative attempts to create contribution limits and make campaign 
donations to congressional offices public information date back to the Tillman Act of 
1907. These early efforts were largely ineffective as they could be easily circumnavigated 
or outright ignored due to the lack of an enforcing agent. Congress continued to make 
periodic efforts to limit the alleged power of unions as well as corporations via their 
excessive financial giving’s. The 70s saw a radical revival in attention to campaign 
finance reform and reporting. These efforts remained largely ineffective for the same 
reasons that the Tillman Act failed to garner real change.  
These continued efforts made by congress eventually culminated in the passage of 
the Federal Elections Campaign Act (FECA) of 1971. However, real change did not 
come until after the Watergate scandal caused widespread and general distrust of the 
government. This resulted in numerous amendments to the FECA which resulted in the 
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birth of the Federal Elections Commission (FEC). With the creation of the FEC, finally 
came the long-needed enforcement agent that was able to oversee elections and the 
financial disclosure process.  
With the creation of the FEC and the sudden public access to campaign finance 
reports and data came an increase in scholarly studies relating to campaign finance. 
Specifically, this allowed political scientists to begin studying the relationship between 
campaign contributions and the vote choices of elected officials (Stratmann, 1995; 
Roscoe and Jenkins, 2005). A dramatic and sudden rise in PAC contributions also 
contributed to this rise in scholarly research. In fact, between 1974 and 1980, PAC 
contributions increased by 500% and the average contributions to congressional office 
seekers tripled (Jacobson, 1983). This jaw dropping influx of money into the political 
system, combined with a growing distrust of the government in the decade, and public 
access to information created the nutrient rich environment for such studies to flourish. 
With all these efforts made, by lawmakers to reform campaign finance and by candidates 
to appear financially independent, the question remains: are these actions necessary? To 
what degree do finances really impact public policy and the formation of the American 
republic?  
The birth of the FEC represented a major advancement in the campaign to 
increase regulations on the role of money in the political arena. However, the discussion 
of campaign finance did not end there. The interest and even fear surrounding campaign 
finance and the alleged effects of high dollar contributions on policy decisions extends to 
members of the mass public. Perhaps the greatest trigger for increased public attention to 
the subject in recent memory came ten years ago with the Supreme Court’s ruling in the 
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case of Citizens United vs. the Federal Elections Commission which ruled that 
corporations and private entities not associated with campaigns cannot be regulated as it 
represents free speech (Citizens United v. FEC, 564 U.S. (2010)). The Supreme Court’s 
ruling as well as misinterpretations of their decision has caused a widespread fear that 
corporations and the super wealthy will be able to funnel unlimited sums of money into 
elections at every level.  
Fears surrounding large campaign contributions have not been confined to the 
national level. In 1973, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts established the Office of 
Campaign and Political Finance (OCPF), which is responsible for tracking contributions 
made for all state and some municipal elections. Since then, OCPF has expanded to 
include city councilors in some of the state’s largest communities and routinely answers 
questions regarding state campaign finance law. The most recent expansion of OCPF 
occurred in November of 2019, the Massachusetts Legislature and Governor Baker 
expanded the powers of OCPF to include a larger number of municipal offices across the 
state (Sullivan Michael, 2019). Across the country, other governing bodies have 
attempted to further regulate campaign finance. Recently the Cities of Denver, Portland, 
and Baltimore, to name a few, have taken steps to lessen the potential effects of large-
scale donations (Holder Sarah, 2018). In 2018, the City of Denver placed new restrictions 
on the amount of money that individual contributors could donate to city officials 
(Omedo, Nike, 2018). Additionally, candidates for office were no longer allowed to 
accept any campaign contributions from businesses of unions. The City also implemented 
a donation-matching program that would provide candidates with taxpayer dollars 
matching the amount of money donated to the candidate, provided that the contribution 
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was less than $50. With these measures, municipal governments have attempted to curb 
unethical favorability from politicians based on the source of large-scale contributions. 
From setting campaign contribution limits to establishing systems of contribution 
matching via public funds, municipalities have sought to minimize the theorized 
influence that campaign contributions have.  
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Despite the supposed dangers to the republic listed previously, conventional 
wisdom amongst the political scientists asserts the belief that roll call votes made by 
political elites remain largely unaffected by campaign contributions. Instead, any 
correlation found between the policies supported by campaign contributors and elected 
officials is thought to be the result of the ability for major contributors to effectively and 
accurately identify candidates that are already squarely in line with their political 
interests.  
If the campaign contribution is made in an effort to change an official’s 
perspective or to support an official with a particular ideology, then a correlation should 
exist. This has been demonstrated at the federal and state levels as political action 
committees commonly provide financial support to candidates that are most likely to vote 
in a favorable fashion (Pool, Romer, and Rosenthal, 1987). 
A. Why Money Matters 
A key assumption that this study and much of the literature surrounding campaign 
finance has taken is that there is a direct relationship between the amount of money raised 
by a political candidate and the likelihood of winning an election. After all, if substantial 
fundraising was not a factor in election outcome, then what motivation would candidates 
have to make an effort to secure contributions? Likewise, why would campaign 
contributors give to candidates that were supportive of their preferred policy outcomes if 
not to aid in election? If a candidate was just as likely to win if a contributor did not 
donate than if they did, then there would be no motivation to expend financial resources 
for that candidate. Thus, a candidate for public office would seek to maximize the amount 
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of funding through contributions whenever possible. Though there can be no disputing 
the importance of fundraising in a political campaign, the degree to which it is important 
likely remains highly subjective from race to race. 
 The traditional school of thought in political science dictates that there is no direct 
causal relationship between campaign contributions from special interest groups and 
voting for policies favorable to that interest group. This has been the typical conclusion 
reached by scholars since the conception of campaign finance studies in the 1970s 
(Fiorina and Peterson 1998). However, studies have varied in the way they approach the 
question, in the number of and what classifies as a control used in the experiment, and in 
resulting conclusions. Through their meta-analysis on the results of over 357 tests on the 
link between campaign finance and roll-call voting, Douglas Roscoe and Shannon 
Jenkins found that about 35.9% of tests found a statistically significant link, arguing in 
favor of a causal relationship (Roscoe and Jenkins 2005). Interestingly, Roscoe and 
Jenkins also found that the most common form of measuring campaign contributions was 
through whole dollar amounts rather than a percentage of total donations. A mere 22.1 % 
of tests utilized the percentage of contributions coming from special interest groups 
(Roscoe and Jenkins 2005). Examining the percentage of total contributions made to an 
official that comes from special interests is a superior method as it highlights the value 
that that particular special interest groups’ contribution is to the recipient. For example, a 
representative might take several million dollars from special interests, but these 
donations may only represent a fraction of total contributions, thus losing the support of 
the special interest group by voting against their preferred outcome may not be too costly 
for the representative. At the same time, a representative that took a small amount of 
14 
 
money from special interests but funded most of their campaign from those contributions 
alone, would have a higher degree of dependence on these funds. This reasoning is 
supported by the results of the meta-analysis which found that when the percentage of 
total contributions from special interests were utilized, 60.8% of tests were significant 
(Roscoe and Jenkins 2005). When just examining the dollar amount, only 28.8% of tests 
were significant (Roscoe and Jenkins 2005). It should also be noted that Roscoe and 
Jenkins wrote about the factors that were controlled for in each study: common factors 
included ideology and party ID.  
B. Dominant Theory and “Ideological Sorting” 
The dominant theory in political science is that any relationship between 
campaign contributions and roll call voting is merely the result of special interest groups 
accurately identifying candidates that are most likely to vote in their favor. Several 
scholars have made this point when arguing that corruption is not as blatant as the general 
populous might expect. This hypothesis has been referred to as “ideological sorting”, 
while the theory that contributions can change an official’s vote has been called the 
“vote-buying” hypothesis (Bronars and Lott, 1997). If ideological sorting is the 
predominating theory, then it not only negates the arguments made by candidates in this 
most recent presidential campaign that they are superior for refusing special interest 
dollars, but suggests that these candidates have made a grave error by not simply taking 
advantage of such large amounts of money.  
Studies that attempt to prove a causal relationship between campaign 
contributions and vote choice will typically attempt to control for factors that have shown 
a strong correlation to vote choice. Such factors include ideological views, the political 
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party of the individual politician (Smith et al, 2012), or the ideological leanings of the 
candidate’s constituency (Markus 1974). 
Filip Palda argues this point in his book. Palda suggests that the American 
political scene had been consumed by what he described as the “Myth of contributions 
and Corruption” (Palda 1994), and that as of the 1990’s, after “exhaustive academic 
research [he] has found no conclusive evidence that election money buys government 
favors”. Instead, he argues that the attractiveness and easy study of campaign 
contributions has detracted scholars from studying other avenues by which big money 
might have an impact on the American political system. This point may have merit as it 
has been found that a mere 10% of interest groups’ resources are spent on campaign 
contributions (Palda 1994). So, while special interest groups may be an essential source 
of funding for candidates, contributing to campaigns may not even be the primary source 
of lobbying available to these groups. In a similar vein, John Wright has argued that 
PACs have been detrimental to the efficiency of the government, by devoting staff and 
congresspersons’ time to securing contributions, rather than encouraging them to actually 
impact the passage of legislation (Wright, 1985), as is their duty. 
Still, at the time of Palda’s writing, other social scientists such as Stephen Bronars 
and John Lott, argued that the question remained largely unsolved and continued to 
research the topic using different measures. Bronas and Lott developed a method by 
which they compared the voting trends of congressmen over the course of their careers as 
they received financial support from PACs and after they had announced their 
retirements, hence no longer seeking campaign contributions. The study utilized special 
interests’ indices on congressmen to determine if their overall support for these special 
16 
 
interest groups’ policy outcomes changed after they announced retirement. They found 
that only one in five special interest groups examined exhibited a significant decrease in 
the congressperson’s voting index. The overall finding of the piece was a strong rejection 
of the “vote buying” hypothesis. 
C. Minority Opinion and “Vote Buying” 
In contrast to the dominant school of thought, a few studies have claimed to have 
found a causal link between contributing to a legislator’s campaign, and that same 
legislator voting for the special interest group’s preferred outcome. In fact, it has even 
been argued that campaign contributions are only rational if they do have an impact on 
congressional voting (Chappell; 1982, Stratmann; 1992). This argument logically follows 
the idea that organizations and individuals contribute to campaigns to benefit from them 
in some way. If contributing to a campaign does not guarantee or at least increase the 
chances that the candidate, if elected, will vote for the preferred outcome, then what 
incentive is there to contribute? Of course, this argument diminishes the theory that 
contributing to a campaign is for the purposes of increasing the chances of electoral 
success, as it would incentivize contributing to campaigns without the expectation of 
guaranteed preferred policy outcomes. Though, to reiterate, much of the literature both in 
support and refuting Vote Buying Theory has focused exclusively on the United States 
House of Representatives, and on Political Action Committees (PACs), hence skewing 
the scope of research results. 
Another argument has been that campaign contributions can affect the vote choice 
of elected officials depending on the timing of the contributions. John Wright at the 
University of Iowa examined the relationship between vote choice and campaign 
contributions while looking at when contributions were made. He determined that 
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campaign contributions were more likely to have a causal link to vote choice when given 
closer to the date of the vote (Wright, 1990). 
Not all theories that suggest causal relationships necessarily fall under the 
umbrella of vote buying. Instead, it has been argued that with many issues and bills 
proposed before lawmakers and only a small amount of time to review them, legislators 
turn to a variety of sources to impact their vote. If a bill comes before them that would 
have relatively little impact on their constituents, but a rather large impact on a campaign 
contributor, then they may be more receptive to lobbyists from the contributor (Roscoe 
and Jenkins 2005).  
From here, scholars are poised to debate on whether the evidence points to 
effective lobbying efforts. Data suggests that tracing lobbying efforts may be a more 
effective way of determining the power of contributions. One such study suggests that 
committee-level voting in congress is predictable based on campaign contributions from 
lobbying groups (Wright 1990). This same study suggests that the lobbying networks 
were in fact the better predictor of congressional votes than the contributions made. Still, 
there are political scientists who believe campaign contributions may in fact play a role in 
the vote choice of elected officials but that the way in which the topic has been studied is 
deeply flawed and as a result, any proof of causality has been masked. Scholars have 
argued that it is the way that campaign finance has been studied that has led to the 
mainstream belief that there is no causal relationship between contributions and vote 
choice, rather than the belief that no relationship exists in general. 
Eleanor Powell, for example, has pointed out that the traditional method used for 
determining if a contribution has impacted a candidate’s policy position is to directly 
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search for a change in the official’s predicted position correlating to a large contribution 
(Powell 2013). A method that is in search of unethical or even illegal actions, thus 
explaining the lack of hard evidence that big money plays a role in policy outcomes. 
Instead, Powell has argued that political scientists should search for more subtle 
indicators. In her piece on the impacts of fundraising in congress, Powell examined the 
lobbying power of congressmen and women who are able to fundraise large amounts of 
money for themselves and fellow officials. It has already been determined that PAC 
contributions rally receptive legislators to pressure their colleagues into supporting and or 
attaching PAC-supported amendments to legislation (Hall and Wayman 1990).  
D. Investment, Networking Strategy, and Incumbency 
To understand the alleged relationship between campaign contributions and 
elected officials’ policy positions, it is useful to look at the reason organizations 
contribute to campaigns. This has been partially addressed in the explanation of 
ideological sorting theory. Ideological sorting faces some challenges, as PAC 
contributions are more likely to move towards candidates in more competitive districts 
instead of necessarily funding the candidate most in line with the PACs agenda (Bronars 
and Lott, 1997; Poole, Romer, and Rosenthal, 1987). John Wright argues that the overall 
objective of PACs is to alter election outcomes, rather than the actual vote choices of the 
candidate. The organizational structure of PACs, which places a great deal of allocating 
power in the hands of local PAC members, has led to personal relationships between 
PAC members and local officials determining their funding instead of the candidates 
policy stances (Wright, 1985; and Grenzke 1989). This would suggest that, instead of 
ideological sorting, networking and strong relationships is a better determinant of 
financial support. 
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Bronars and Lott also found that campaign contributions from PACs actually 
increased contributions to candidates that lost re-election, a finding that they theorized 
was the result of PACs accurately identifying supporters that were engaged in highly 
contested races. This course of action introduces us to another theory, one that runs 
parallel to those already discussed: that campaign contributors follow an “investment” 
strategy when determining which candidates to financially support (Fleischmann and 
Stein; 1998). 
In the United States, there has been one kingmaking characteristic of candidates 
that appears to be essential. This is, of course, the power of incumbency. For numerous 
reasons, at multiple levels of government, candidates seeking an office who already hold 
the office have a higher chance of electoral success. In recent years, over 90% of 
congressional office holders were re-elected (Reelection Rates over the Years, 2018). 
Though Congressional lawmakers have enjoyed an incumbent advantage since the late 
1960s (Ansolabehere and Snyder, 2004), candidates on lower levels of government have 
been experiencing the same advantage. By examining the local city council elections in 
St. Louis and Atlanta, Fleischmann and Stein found little evidence to suggest that there 
was a relationship between the amount of money raised by candidates and the outcome of 
the election (Fleischmann and Stein 1998). Instead, incumbency played a significant role 
in whether a candidate would win the election. This conclusion was corroborated by 
researchers Kushner, Siegel and Stanwick. Therefore, the prior assertion of campaign 
contribution interference may be entirely discredited. 
Investment strategy can be observed with regards to the incumbents’ abilities to 
secure strong financial backing. There has been dispute over whether PACs, like 
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businesses, are more likely to support incumbents over candidates with similar 
ideological preferences. Barber 2016, Grenzke 1989, and Fleischmann and Stein 1998 
substantiate this assessment at the municipal level, claiming that business interests in 
Atlanta and St. Louis followed an “investment strategy” when selecting which councilors 
to financially support by heavily supporting incumbents and candidates for citywide 
office over newcomers and ward councilors (Fleischmann and Stein 1998).  
 In Krebs 2001, incumbency was tested against several other major predictors for 
fundraising, including experience, gender, and political endorsements. The goal of this 
study was to definitively assert or toss out the supposed incumbency advantage in 
fundraising at the municipal level. The study examined municipal elections from 1989 to 
1999 in Los Angeles and Chicago. In Chicago, an endorsement from an incumbent meant 
an average of an additional $39,000 towards campaign funds. In Los Angeles, the 
difference was over $54,000. Interestingly enough, the study also highlighted the 
strikingly little influence that candidate professional acumen and political connections 
had on attracting campaign contributions, hence bolstering the theory that there is an 
inherent advantage that is had from being the incumbent candidate. 
 The strategy of financially favoring incumbents indicates that contributions 
provide access to legislators more than anything. Special interest groups value having 
strong networks to and with powerful legislators, thus making lobbying for policy 
initiatives easier. If a supported candidate is not likely to win an election, then having a 
strong network with the failed candidate is, clearly, significantly less valuable than 
having a strong relationship with the victor, even if the winner is less friendly towards the 
groups policy positions. For the main focus of the research, investment strategy can be 
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interpreted in two ways: 1) Special interests do not always give to the candidate that 
already agrees with them and thus they are attempting to sway legislators, or; 2) 
Campaign contributors are attempting to network with legislators, and while the goal may 
be to secure access and potential support for friendly policies, this is done through 
lobbying efforts made possible through the contribution and not from the contribution 
itself.  
E. Theories on Municipal Government 
Shockingly, despite the vast amount of research that has tracked the connection 
between campaign contributions and roll-call voting, and the immense attention paid to 
campaign finance in general, the scope of research has largely been limited to the United 
States House of Representatives. Few studies have expanded the examination to other 
legislative bodies. This focus on the House of Representatives is perplexing since in the 
federal system of government within the United States citizens are constantly being 
governed by multiple bodies simultaneously. It is possible that candidates for Congress 
are subject to strict FEC guidelines regarding the acceptance and expenditure of 
campaign contributions and funds, therefore demanding an increase in documentation 
and hence additional data. At the same time, large amounts of data have historically been 
unavailable for municipalities (Tausanovitch and Warshaw, 2014). In recent years, as 
more municipal data has become available, there has been a noted increase in focus on 
municipal government. However, even now the lens is skewed in the direction of mega-
metropolises such as New York City, Los Angeles, Chicago2, and other hubs that operate 
 
2 See; (Krebs, 2005; Hogan and Simpson, 2001; Kaufmann, 2004; Grimshaw, 1992; Simpson, 2001; Rast, 
1999; Krebs and Pelissero 1997) 
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much differently than the majority of cities in the United States. Tragically, many of 
these studies have been the focus of developer interest, and there is, by default, far more 
developer interest in large cities than smaller municipalities. 
This lack of diversity amongst studies was highlighted through a meta-analysis 
review of the literature regarding. In their review, Roscoe and Jenkins found that a mere 
6% of studies examined the U.S. Senate or state legislature, while 77% of studies focused 
on the U.S. House, and the remaining 17% focused on particular house subsets such as 
house committees (Roscoe and Jenkins 2005). It is astonishing that a subject of such 
widespread discussion and influence has been so severely handicapper in academia by 
such a narrow focus. As a result, we cannot conclusively say anything about the role of 
campaign contributions on rollcall voting for the majority of elected offices in the 
country, because to do so would be a ghastly overgeneralization. 
It can be argued that perhaps conventional wisdom has managed to hold strong 
because members of the House are under a greater level of scrutiny. We may find that the 
Uncertainty Principle, the act of measuring an object inherently changes it, is at play. As 
Congressmen are aware that they are key subjects of study, they may artificially alter 
their course of action, and elected officials at other levels of government may be less 
likely to conform to the perceived correct course of action. 
Despite an estimated 350 million dollars spent on campaigns in municipal 
elections in 1993 alone (Alexander and Corrado 1992), scholars in political science have 
largely ignored campaign finance in local elections. Campaign finance is not unique in 
this regard. Some studies have instead focused on the election process alone, and not the 
voting trends or actions of individual elected officials. Furthermore, the focus on larger 
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cities rather than smaller municipalities, and hence the impossibility for a generalizable 
conclusion, leads one to believe that the field is largely dominated by regime theory and 
growth machine theory. 
However, theories that do exist regarding actions at the municipal level share 
common components with their large-scale counterparts. For example, the belief that 
donors make strategic contributions to maximize “returns” has also been applied to 
municipal governments (Jacobson and Kernell, 1983; Mutz, 1995; Krebs, 2005). 
Additionally, this theory argues that it is not incumbency that provides candidates with an 
advantage when fundraising, but rather residing on the inside of the dominant “machine 
coalition”, thus creating a “system that favors insiders and punishes outsiders” (Krebs, 
2005). Once more, the theory prevails that networking plays a strong role in determining 
if candidates will receive adequate campaign funding from the dominant political 
machine in the local municipality. Unfortunately, no conclusions were drawn as to if 
individuals had to comply with the machine coalitions’ policy objectives in order to be 
guaranteed financial backing, and the definition of what constitutes a regime remains 
loose. This leaves the research on municipal studies with a gaping hole of uncertainty.  
Machine Growth theory also suggests that municipal officials rely on those who 
are heavily invested in land use such as those involved in real estate or large-scale 
development for much of their campaign resources (Logan and Molotch 1987).  
Scholars have, to a large degree, failed to examine the campaign finance aspect of 
the relationship between special interests and elected officials (Fleischmann and Stein 
1998: 674). Furthermore, the attention that has been paid has mostly focused on large 
cities with populations of over several hundred thousand people with some studies 
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focusing on major metropolises such as New York City, London, Chicago, and Los 
Angeles. Geographic political differences aside, it is difficult to claim that a result found 
New York City, population 8.6 million, comparable to the town of Montague, 
Massachusetts, population 8.2 thousand or to the numerous suburban areas that make up 
large swaths of the country. 
The research that has been done has suggested that the largest contributions to 
candidates come from businesses and business interests (Fleischmann and Stein 1998). 
This would seemingly allude to the theory that municipal candidates seeking to fundraise 
in order to better their chances for electoral success must invest their efforts in receiving 
the support of the business community. Additionally, this would also suggest that 
candidates who did win elections would be better connected to the business community. 
These studies have little generalizability outside of the time period and individual 
municipalities in which they were conducted. Campaigning for municipal seats in the 
megacities of London, New York City, and Chicago is simply not comparable to the vast 
majority of local municipal races. For example, Mayor Bloomberg’s $109 million 
reelection campaign (Best Shaun, 2009) cannot be directly compared to a local school 
board race in a small community that barely tops a few thousand dollars. The 
discrepancies in campaign finance even in much smaller cities can vary widely. As of 
2018, the average incumbent city councilor in the city of Boston, population 685,094, 
raised roughly  $224,808 per year that they served on the city council.3 The next closest 
amongst the 14 largest cities in Massachusetts, the City of Quincy, is almost a quarter of 
 
3 Average annual donations per year calculated by finding the average of the sum of total contributions 
made to each councilor divided by the number of years that councilor served in the dataset created herein. 
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that amount. In the City of Quincy, population 94,166, with $60,270 per councilor per 
year. To put the amount raised by city councilors in Boston into perspective, the average 
for each city councilor in the 14 most populous municipalities in Massachusetts is about 
$36,138. Even Boston pales in comparison to the major metropolises with populations in 
the millions. 
Perhaps a reason that studying the actions of elites at municipal levels has been 
largely ignored in comparison to studies at the state and national level is that these local 
elites are not always easily categorized into ideological classifications. In most municipal 
elections, partisan identification of candidates is not placed on the ballot, and when it is, 
it is mostly irrelevant as it would be useless in providing an indication as to how that 
candidate will approach a plethora of issues. Except for perhaps a few major actions that 
can directly impact neighboring communities, most issues that come before a municipal 
body offer no wider implications or are entirely unique to the municipality in question. 
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODS 
 Through this study I hope to fill in the missing pieces of current literature by 
examining the relationships between vote choice and campaign contributions of elected 
officials at the local level, to help establish or disaffirm the widely accepted school of 
thought in an area that has seen little attention. Rather than focus on the elected officials 
in a mega city, I instead turned my attention to smaller and medium sized cities in 
Massachusetts. This study utilized city councilor campaign finance data in the 14 cities in 
Massachusetts which had contribution data available through the Office of Campaign and 
Political Finance (OCPF).  Previous studies at the congressional level have tended to 
focus on a singular vote or set of votes surrounding the same area, such as national 
defense or farming bills. In a similar fashion, this study turns its attention to city 
councilor votes on tax classification.  
Studies that attempt to find a correlation between campaign contributions and 
vote choice must identify a policy proposal to observe how officials with different 
campaign contributors respond to it. In congressional studies the policy proposal can be 
defense spending, farm subsidies, or any number of factors. From here, the researcher can 
examine every congressperson’s roll call vote as well as their campaign contributions. 
This is not the case at the municipal level as many issues that come before one council 
are specific to that community. However, in Massachusetts and a number of other states, 
elected officials in every community are forced to take the same vote on tax 
classification. This subject allows us to compare city councilors across multiple 
communities. This is beneficial as many studies at the municipal level sacrifice a certain 
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degree of generalizability by focusing on large cities that have a large enough number of 
councilors to examine, as in the case of Chicago. By utilizing an issue that is applicable 
to every community, we can avoid the heavy and arguably ungeneralizable focus on large 
cities. Furthermore, the issue of tax classification in Massachusetts has served as the basis 
for previous studies regarding the vote choice of individual voters when their financial 
self-interests are at stake.4 
In addition to its value for theoretical purposes, there are real world applications 
and practical benefits to be had from a better understanding of the factors that contribute 
to the selection of split tax rates within communities. Municipal budgets across the 
United States depend heavily on revenue from property taxes and the setting of these 
taxes affects the property values of those in the community, where certain businesses will 
choose to locate, and ultimately how much money property owners must shell out to 
cover their municipalities bills. Differences in the split rates can mean the differences of 
tens of thousands of dollars a year for some businesses if the rates are moved 
substantially in either direction. By better understanding the process of adopting tax 
classification we can better understand the factors that influence how municipal officials 
make one of the most important decisions as a member of that elected body and a 
decision that affects millions of people in their own communities across the country.  
A. History of Tax Classification 
Every year in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, all 351 municipal 
governmental bodies, without distinction of property value, racial makeup, or any other 
 
4 See Bloom, Howard S. "Public choice and private interest: explaining the vote for property tax 
classification in Massachusetts." National Tax Journal (1979): 527-534. 
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factor, must vote to raise/lower/maintain their current tax classifications. In 1979, the 
Massachusetts Legislature adopted Mass. General Law Chapter 40 § 56, which allowed 
municipalities in the Commonwealth to shift the tax burden between property 
classifications. This law was made possible by a Constitutional amendment approved by 
the voters during the previous year (Bloom Howard, 1979). In short, the statute allowed 
municipalities to establish four distinct property classifications: Residential, Open, 
Commercial, and Industrial (Mass. Gen. Laws Chapter 59, § 38). These categories are 
typically grouped into two separate tax rates, one for properties classified as “residential” 
or “open space” (RO) and the other for “commercial,” “industrial,” and “personal 
property” (CIP) (Cronin S. R., 2017). The creation of tax classification allowed for the 
executive bodies of municipal governments to determine which class of property would 
pay what proportion of the upcoming fiscal year’s tax levy, essentially determining who 
will Foot The Bill for the coming fiscal year. 
Chapter 40 was intended to provide financial relief to residents who were 
experiencing disproportionately rising property values. As residential property values 
increased at a more accelerated rate than commercial properties, municipalities argued 
that their residents were supporting an unequal burden of the tax levy (Massachusetts 
Dual Tax Rates, 2014). In order to redistribute the tax burden in an arguably more 
egalitarian fashion, cities and towns in Massachusetts with large and or growing 
commercial sectors began to adopt split rates. As a result, commercial sectors that saw 
relatively slower growth rates in property values would still be supporting what was 
considered by the policy makers to be a fair share of the tax burden. 
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As of fiscal year, 2019, 110 communities have split tax rates, up from 108 in 
fiscal year 2018. The costs to a commercial property associated with a split rate can be 
quite substantial as there are typically fewer of them to share the burden. As a result, 
local chambers of commerce and members of the business community frequently push 
for the communities that they operate in to stay at or move towards a single tax rate.  
The issue of tax classification serves as a perfect subject to examine a multitude 
of political questions surrounding the actions of voters, special interests, and elites at the 
municipal level. Despite this, only a handful of studies have made use of tax 
classification and to my knowledge, none have used classification to test for correlation 
between campaign contributions and roll call voting at the municipal level. By examining 
campaign contributions made to city councilors from business owners and coding for 
those particular councilors' votes at their respective annual tax classification hearing it is 
possible to establish whether or not a correlation commonly purported at the 
congressional level is present in Massachusetts municipalities.  
B. Tax Classification Explained 
This research seeks to examine if there is in fact a correlation between municipal 
elite’s support for pro-business policy stances and contributions from business leaders 
and members of the local Chamber of Commerce at the municipal level. This will help 
shed light on the theories surrounding the potential relationship between special interest 
political contributions and the policy positions of elected officials outside of a focus on 
development concerns in major cities. Tax classification in Massachusetts offers an ideal 
subject for studies of this type.  
Every year since 1979, municipal officials at all levels, in every city and town 
across the Commonwealth, are asked the same question. How should the community that 
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they govern split the tax burden for the next fiscal year? Though the details of the process 
vary slightly across communities, the general premise remains consistent. For cities in 
Massachusetts, the annual tax classification must be decided at an annual public hearing 
where members of the public, including participation from both residents and Chamber of 
Commerce/business leaders.  
Despite taking place in every municipality in Massachusetts annually since 1979, 
the complexities of setting the tax classification are commonly misunderstood even by 
the legislators themselves. The most common misconception made by residents and 
councilors alike is that setting the CIP split would impact the communities’ total levy. It 
is important to clarify that the budget of the municipality does not change based on the 
change in the gap between RO and CIP properties (referred to as the CIP split). A 
municipality's upcoming fiscal year budget has already been set and approved by the time 
of the classification hearing. A shift in the CIP split simply changes the proportion of the 
total levy that each property classification will be required to provide.  
As an example, the Town of Auburn, Massachusetts, as of 2019, has an assessed 
value of residential and open space parcels of $1,275,580,965, or 70.37%, and an 
assessed value of commercial, industrial and personal property parcels of $537,119,110, 
or 29.63%. If the burden of total taxable parcels was to be divided equally, and the town 
of Auburn adopted a CIP Shift of 1, a single rate, then the RO parcels would be 
responsible for producing 70.37% of the total levy from taxable properties while the CIP 
parcels would only be responsible for producing 29.63% of the total levy from taxable 
properties. Each classification would be responsible for producing the percentage share of 
the levy equal to their assessed value. This means that the individual taxpayer will be 
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responsible for paying $18.66 per $1,000 of assessed value of their property whether it be 
CIP or RO based. 
Instead, the Town of Auburn, like many other municipalities, has adopted a split 
rate. As of November 2018, the CIP Shift was set at 1.25. Thus, the RO share moves 
from 70.37% to 62.96% while the CIP share rises from 29.63% to 37.04%. For an 
individual’s tax bill this would translate to $16.7 per $1,000 of assessed value of RO 
parcels and $23.33 per $1,000 of assessed value of CIP parcels. Put simply, the farther 
above a CIP shift of 1 a city or town moves, a larger piece of the tax burden is moved 
onto commercially assessed properties. It is possible, though rare, for communities to 
travel in the opposite direction. For example, a CIP shift of less than 1 would result in a 
heavier tax burden on residentially assessed properties than on commercial.  
Chapter 58 of M.G.L. sets complex limits as to the extent to which municipal 
boards and councils can shift their tax burdens between the two classifications. The 
maximum by which a community can move the rate is unique for each individual 
municipality. No community can raise the share of the tax burden on CIP properties to 
more than 150% of their full and fair assessed cash value. At the same time, no municipal 
board or council can allow residential properties to pay less than 65% of their full and fair 
cash value (Mass. Gen. Laws Chapter 59, § 5c). At the same time, a municipality may not 
pass more than 60% on CIP classified properties. It follows that Chambers of Commerce 
would support movement on the CIP shift that is most favorable to commercial 
properties. 
It is no secret that Chambers of Commerce support the movement on the CIP 
Shift that is more favorable to properties classified as commercial. It is not uncommon 
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for Chamber members to attend the classification hearing or lobby councils in advance of 
the hearing in the form of emails or letters supporting a decrease in the CIP Shift.  
In many ways, the issue of tax classification at the municipal level in 
Massachusetts is a more fitting subject of analysis than matters that come before the 
United States House of Representatives. Massachusetts open meeting law requires that 
counselors restrict deliberation to an “open”, or public, meeting. Thus the observers can 
see the entirety of the process, including both debate and negotiation amongst lawmakers. 
These interactions can be unobservable at the congressional level. Voted on annually, tax 
classification allows for analysis of something consistent and generalizable. Finally, 
studies performed at the congressional level relied on either a single bill or a mere 
handful of bills, giving them only a snapshot of how an individual policy maker might 
respond to an issue. This creates a binary set of observations in which the elected official 
in question either voted for or against the observed subject. Tax classification provides a 
scale of distributed values on which we can place a lawmaker.  
Councilors, Selectmen, and Aldermen will usually consider several factors before 
discussing the rate in a public hearing. A common factor includes changes in commercial 
and residential property values and or changes to the proportion of the total value that 
these properties make up. This is found by dividing the value of all taxable properties 
classified as commercial by the value of a community's total taxable parcels. As 
residential and commercial property values change from year to year and as new projects 
are built, renovated, or removed, the percent of taxable parcels comprising commercially 
classified properties changes. This change in proportion of the municipalities total value 
means that each classification may be paying for a greater or lower share of the levy. For 
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example, if all commercial properties within a community made up 30% of the total 
taxable property value within a town and that town had a single rate, then the commercial 
properties would be responsible for covering 30% of the towns total levy. Other factors 
that may influence a councilor’s decision in setting the tax rate are changes made to the 
coming fiscal year’s budget, changes in state aid, or how the communities around them 
have moved on the rate.  
C. Massachusetts and Selected Communities 
Massachusetts, and the cities and towns within it, serve as a suitable 
representation for the average city council. The budgets of communities in Massachusetts 
depend most heavily on revenue taken in from property taxes to fund their town 
operations and services, as is the case with most municipalities across the country (Wu, 
2009). As of 2010, 25 states and the District of Columbia have split property taxes (Lee, 
Wheaton 2010). All 50 states have adopted laws or restrictions in one form or another 
that in some way regulate the campaign finance process of elected officials within the 
state. However, no individual community in this study in Massachusetts has implemented 
additional campaign finance restrictions on its own and it is relatively rare for any 
community to do so. This means that there is consistency in the rules across 
Massachusetts, allowing for research to focus not just on a single city, but on councilors 
across multiple. The matter of tax classification, as discussed above, must be voted on by 
every municipalities’ governing board annually. This again allows for consistency across 
town lines and for anticipation by campaign contributors and councilors that this issue 
will come up for a vote. These factors allow me to study several cities at once rather than 
an individual city council. This is beneficial as more data is available and a larger area 
covered thus improving the generalizability of any results found. Additionally, many 
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cities and municipalities in the United States do not have populations in the millions. The 
fact that every community, with the notable exception of Boston, in Massachusetts has a 
population under 200 thousand helps to create a picture of what happens in the vast 
majority of communities in the United States, rather than just focusing on major 
metropolises. Finally, Massachusetts open meeting law requires that municipal 
lawmakers deliberate only while in open meeting. Thus, there is no potential for a deal 
between lawmakers to be reached outside of a meeting as to what the tax rate to be. 
Instead, all deliberation must happen in the classification meeting, in a way, forcing 
elected officials to show their hand. 
 While the preferred method for selection would be a randomized sampling of 
either all municipalities or those with split rates, I was constrained by the lack of a 
centralized location for both campaign and contribution data. Though every candidate for 
office is required to submit their contribution data, the Massachusetts Office of Campaign 
and Political Finance (OCPF) only tracks donations made to city councilors in 
communities with populations larger than 65,000 residents. Contributions made to 
officials in smaller municipalities are only maintained by individual city clerks. Due to 
time constraints, I chose to focus on the communities in which contribution data could be 
easily accessed from a central location, in this case; the OCPF online database. As a 
result, the research was focused on the 14 municipalities with contribution data readily 
available. These communities are, in descending order by population, the cities of 
Boston, Worcester, Springfield, Lowell, Cambridge, New Bedford, Brockton, Quincy, 
Lynn, Fall River, Newton, Lawrence, Somerville, and Framingham. 
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Though not a very large or randomized sample, the 14 communities selected are 
comparable to most municipalities in Massachusetts with regard to their movement on tax 
classification. However, it is of note that these municipalities have selected much higher 
CIP splits than the state average. The Massachusetts Division of Local Services began 
tracking the CIP Shifts in each community in fiscal year (FY) 2003. Since then there has 
been a significant amount of movement in the average CIP Shift selected by communities 
in Massachusetts. Figure 1 shown in the appendix, illustrates the average CIP shift of the 
fourteen cities that were selected for this study for each fiscal year from FY 2003 to FY 
2019 compared to the state average as well as the average amongst towns that have 
adopted split rates. Despite the clear differences in the average CIP split selected, the 
average rate in selected communities does rise and fall with the state average for 
communities with split rates. 
As previously stated, the Massachusetts legislature has placed restrictions on the 
degree to which a municipality can shift the tax burden onto commercial properties. For 
fiscal year 2019, the maximum CIP split that any community was permitted to move to 
would be a CIP split of 1.75, though the communities of Malden and Medford had special 
permission to raise rates even higher (Massachusetts Department of Revenue, 2020). 
Additionally, every community in the dataset, except for one, was limited to a 1.75 CIP 
shift ceiling. The city of Cambridge was limited to a split of 1.638691. This is significant 
as not all communities select a tax rate from the same range of available options. This is 
important to keep in mind when following where cities choose to place themselves as a 
move towards 1.64 may be a tax break for commercial properties in Boston, but a tax 
increase to the max for commercial properties in Cambridge. 
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At the same time, the communities’ style of government was not completely 
comparable to many municipalities in Massachusetts. The chart in the appendix labeled 
figure 2 shows the dispersion of communities with and without split rates by their form of 
government. We can classify the forms of government in Massachusetts into five 
categories: Mayor-manager-council (3), Council-manager(12), Mayor-council(43), Open 
town meeting(259), and Representative town meeting(33).5 Of the 14 communities in this 
research, all but three were Mayor-council forms of government. The remaining three, 
Worcester, Cambridge, and Lowell, were Mayor-manager-council forms of government. 
Split rates were most popular amongst these forms of government which indicates that 
there are common factors at play within these municipalities driving them to split their 
tax rates. Population and the size of their commercial sectors may contribute to this trend. 
An observation worth noting but not explored in this piece is that this runs contrary to 
what we should expect.6 Unfortunately, this pattern had to be overlooked as a randomized 
sampling of communities across Massachusetts had to be ruled out and cities with data 
available were utilized. 
D. Variables and Data Collection 
 For the sake of maintaining simplicity, voting record on tax classification is made 
the dependent variable. To be completely clear, this is not intended to imply that a 
 
5 The municipality of Woburn is the only one in the Commonwealth to have a Mayor-Alderman form of 
government which is unique from the other five categories. For the purposes of the chart Woburn was 
grouped with the Mayor-Council form of government. As of FY 2019 Woburn has a split tax rate.  
6 As power is moved away from the hands of the voters, who have the greatest power in open town meeting 
governments, and into the hands of elected and appointed officials, with voters in manager council styles 
having the least power, split rates become more likely. This is odd as voters in a community are 
predominantly residents who do not own businesses and so we should expect them to vote in their own 
financial interest and push to lower their own tax rates at the expense of commercial properties.  
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councilor’s vote might necessarily be changed by a large influx of contributions from 
business owners. Even in a scenario whereby legitimate acts of political corruption had 
occurred; a councilor could vote for a lowered commercial rate and then accept campaign 
contributions. Rather, the dependent variable was selected to allow consistency within 
this study and with literature on the subject. A potentiality that political scientists should 
be cognizant of is the potential impact that voting record may have on campaign 
contributions from business owners. Observing a repeated favorable voting record on tax 
classification may increase a business owner's likelihood of contributing to that 
individual councilor.  
 The voting records for elected officials are retained by the town or city clerk in 
their respective locations. All voting records are made available through a public records 
request to the clerk’s office. However, in several cases the votes were easily accessed 
through the publicly available meeting minutes posted on city websites. Council votes 
were coded on a binary scale. Unlike most studies conducted at the congressional level, 
votes could not be coded as simply as assigning a 1 to yea and 0 to nay responses to 
determine if an elected official is supportive or in opposition to a motion. In determining 
congressional support for defense contracts, a yea vote clearly establishes support for the 
contract while a nay vote implies opposition in any time where a contract is in question. 
This applies to many congressional studies that have coded the vote choice of 
congressmen. However, every motion on tax classification is unique as it is not a binary 
decision but rather a choice of location on a linear scale. The motion may be to move the 
CIP Split closer to 1, in this case a yae vote typically indicates a pro commercial stance 
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and a nay vote a pro resident stance. However, the motion may be to move the split 
further from 1, inverting the meanings of a yae and nae vote.  
Due to the inconsistencies in implications from yae or nae votes regarding tax 
classification, each vote had to be examined on an individual basis. If the motion in 
question was movement towards a single rate, an outcome that would be favorable to the 
business community, then a yea vote was coded as a 1 and dissenting opinions were 
coded as 0. If the motion was an attempt to move the rate closer to or remain at the 1.75 
max split, yae votes were coded as 0’s and nay votes were coded as 1’s. This allowed for 
individual councilors to be placed into two separate columns; those that preferred a 
business outcome and those that preferred a pro-resident outcome. Only one councilor 
abstained from voting.7 In this case the councilor's abstention was not explained and she 
was assumed to be in favor of maintaining the status quo rather than approving the 
motion to move the rate. Thus, an abstention vote was treated as a dissenting vote.  
Utilizing only this method for establishing each councilor’s preferred outcome 
assumes that dissenting council members prefer the status quo, or the current CIP split to 
the proposed movement. However, from viewing recordings of the meetings it became 
evident that councilors may vote for a rate change that they oppose in order to prevent a 
more extreme proposal from passing. Similarly, it is not out of the question that a 
councilor might oppose a motion to move in their preferred direction because it does not 
go far enough.  
 
7 Councilor Levy of Lawrence did not explain their abstention. See Lawrence City Council meeting 
December 4, 2018. 
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Coding for certain councilors had to be corrected. This was only true in the cases 
of Marcus Williams of Springfield and Steven Camara of Fall River. Councilor Williams 
spoke in opposition to raising taxes on residents at the meeting and argued that “the 
residents are my constituents that I am here to represent”.8 Though the vote that 
Councilor Williams opposed was one that gave preferential treatment to residents it is 
heavily suggested by his statements that his opposition was that the movement was not 
far enough. It was clear that Councilor Williams' opposition to the motion was not 
founded in a sympathetic view towards commercial properties and as a result he was 
coded as a 0 for the meeting, or a pro resident opinion. Councilor Camara advocated and 
motioned for the greatest possible split allowed under Massachusetts law for the City of 
Fall River. When his motion failed, Councilor Camara dissented from the majority 
opinion as it did not move the rate far enough. In this instance it would not make logical 
sense to code Councilor Camara as having a pro commercial standing for voting nay and 
he was coded for having supported a pro resident outcome. 
It is not uncommon to see multiple votes taken or to see elected representatives 
debate where to move the rate at any given time. Of the 14 cities that were looked at, only 
3, Worcester, Springfield, and Fall River, had debates where multiple motions were filed. 
Instances like this provided a significantly more informative view of each councilor’s 
perspective on where the FY 2019 CIP split should fall.  
 As with studies conducted at the congressional level, the most basic unit is the 
individual elected official in each community with the ability to cast a vote on tax 
 
8 See Springfield City Council meeting November 28, 2018. 
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classification. In Massachusetts, campaign contributions made to any person seeking 
elected office must be filed and reported to the local Town or City Clerk. Additionally, 
open meeting law requires that all agenda meetings be posted and the minutes, including 
vote records, be made available to the public.  
The 14 cities that I was able to include in my analysis had a total of 161 
individual city councilors. Of these 161, 11 had to be eliminated leaving 150 city 
councilors for the final analysis. The details on which 11 councilors were removed will 
be addressed in detail later. All campaign contributions made on or before the date of the 
municipality’s classification hearing were tallied.9 In the case of Springfield, where the 
vote on classification was tabled to a second meeting, donations up until the day of the 
public hearing were tallied. Any contributions made between the initial meeting date and 
the actual vote were not recorded as they would have occurred after the scheduled vote. 
As each of these municipalities operates under a city council form of government, city 
councilors were the only elected officials to serve as the subject of study. The one 
exception to this is Mayor Joseph Petty Jr., who, due to an unusual style of government, 
serves as both the Mayor and Councilor at-large in the City of Worcester, thus despite 
being in the executive body, Mayor Petty cast a vote at the tax classification hearing as a 
city councilor.   
The main predictor variable was campaign contribution data. Under 
Massachusetts campaign finance law, any contribution made to a candidate equal to or 
greater than $200 requires that the contributor disclose their occupation and employer. In 
 
9 Classification dates varied from community to community and had to be determined by reviewing 
meeting minutes and agendas. 
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all cases where occupation and employment were provided, the columns were scanned 
for words that indicated the contributor was likely a business owner or had a vested 
interest in the success of commercial entities. Keywords that indicated ties to businesses 
within a community consisted of; “CEO”, “Chief Executive Officer”, “Management”, 
“Manager”, “Founder”, “Vice Chair”, “Vice Pres”, “V.P.”, “Chairman”, “Director”, 
”Executive”, “Owner”, “Self”10, ''Partner”, “President”, or “VP.” From here it was 
possible to determine which contributions came from those who were either business 
owners or involved in upper management positions and thus likely members of the 
business community. If any of the above-mentioned words or phrases appeared as a 
contributor’s employer or occupation column then the contribution made by that 
individual was considered from a person with ties to commercial properties. 
The contribution totals from business leaders were then divided by the candidates 
total donations accepted to get the proportion of total contributions given to each city 
councilor that came from potential business leaders before their vote at their respective 
municipality’s tax classification hearing. Studies at the congressional level have varied in 
whether to assess the dollar value or the proportion of contributions from business 
interests (Roscoe and Jenkins, 2004). In theory, examining the percentage of total 
contributions coming from business owners should highlight the significance of business 
contributions to a candidate's overall war chest. A councilor who has over 50% of their 
contributions coming from business owners is more dependent on that block of donors 
 
10 While the word “Self” was used to indicate if an individual was “self-employed,” it is important to note 
that in several occasions contributors who were stay at home parents also labeled themselves as “self-
employed,” thus creating potential for a slightly inflated number for campaign contributions. 
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for financial support than a councilor who only has 10% of their contributions coming 
from business owners. This dependence is not as easily recognized if we were to just 
examine the dollar amount of contributions. In that case, politicians who were 
particularly skilled at fundraising in general may have higher than average contributions 
from business owners, but they may make up a small proportion of their overall 
contributions. This could also apply to city councilors that had been in office for a longer 
period of time and as a result had received a large amount from businesses over a 20-year 
career but were not dependent on that block.  
 A few other potential predictor variables were considered and factored into the 
analysis. Councilors in leadership positions were added as a dummy variable and coded 
as a 1 if they served as a Council, Chair, Vice-Chair, President, Vice President, or, in the 
case of Worcester, Mayor. All other councilors were coded as 0s. All councilors were 
coded for their roles on the date that the FY 2019 tax classification hearing occurred in 
their respective communities. It should be noted that there were officials in several 
communities that had previously held leadership roles. This was not accounted for when 
coding for the leadership dummy variable.  
Incumbency, At-Large, and a Gender variable were added as well. The 
incumbency variable was created to mark individuals who were incumbents in the last 
election as, by definition, all councilors were incumbents at the time of the vote. 
Councilors who were serving their first term at the time of the classification hearing were 
coded as 0s and those who were on a second term or greater were coded at 1. Gender and 
At-Large seats were also coded on a binary scale. 
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 The final predictor variable factored into the model was the change in percent of 
each municipality's total property value comprised of CIP properties from FY 2018 to FY 
2019. Since tax rates have an ultimate impact on the value of properties and the new 
growth of different property classifications can impact what proportion of the tax levy 
each classification is responsible for paying, it is reasonable to believe that the tax rate 
may be impacted by changes in commercial growth. Because of the potential influence 
that this variable can have over the decisions of municipal officials, I control for it in the 
equation. Cuts to municipal cherry sheets, or state aid, in Massachusetts have been found 
to correlate with and cause increases in the overall tax levy of communities (Wu, 2009). 
However, reduced state aid has not been found to directly impact the division of the tax 
burden regarding split rates and as a result, state aid was left out as a predictor. Also not 
controlled for were the selected rates of the neighboring communities of those selected. 
While there is some evidence to suggest that the actions of neighboring municipalities 
regarding commercial tax rates may have had minimal influence over the decisions of 
officials in British Columbia, a race to the bottom strategy leading to detrimental 
economic impacts has been rejected (Brett, and Pinkse; 2000) 
Missing or null data was produced in two ways, unavailable contribution data and 
or a missing voting record on the city councilor in question. For the former, councilors 
may not have had their contribution data available through the Office of Campaign and 
Political Finance’s (OCPF) database if they had established a bank account associated 
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with the campaign prior to filing with OCPF11. This only applied to six councilors.12 
Councilors who were absent from the classification hearing were unable to cast votes. In 
all of the subject cities, a total of eight councilors were not present for the hearing.13 As a 
result, there was no way of determining their preferred movement on CIP split for FY 
2019. Councilors with missing data were removed from the dataset for the statistical 
analysis portion of this research. Several councilors had missing contribution data and 
were not present at the classification hearing. In the end, the dataset was left with 150 
unique observations. It should be noted that the campaign contribution totals and totals 
from business leaders still utilized councilors who had available contribution data but 
who were not present for the classification hearing.  
E. Statistical Equation 
 For the purposes of this study, the dependent variable, councilor’s vote on tax 
rate, is coded on a binary scale; 0 for opposing a commercially friendly split and 1 for 
supporting a commercially friendly split. By coding on a binary scale, we are able to 
simplify each councilor's position on the matter of tax classification and remove 
discrepancies in the value associated with the CIP split between cities. A councilor in Fall 
River that supports moving in a pro-business direction may support moving closer to a 
 
11 In these cases, candidates either did not have to file with OCPF when they first ran for office or had 
previously had an account that did not have to register with OCPF (such as selectman and or other minor 
offices). In these cases, OCPF did not log contributions retroactively and so contribution data along the 
councilor's careers may be incomplete. This does not pose much of a threat to the study as most city 
councils had data available through OCPF and even councilors that may have had previous contributions go 
untracked, any donations made specifically for them to run for city council would be logged.  
12 Contribution data was not available for councilors Leonard J Gentile, Gregory Schwartz, Victoria 
Danberg, and Cheryl Lappin of Newton, and Margaret Shepard and Edguardo Torres of Framingham. 
13 Councilor, now Congresswoman, Ayanna Pressley of Boston, James Milinazzo of Lowell, Debora 
Coelho of New Bedford, Leonard Gentile, Cheryl Lappin and John Rice of Newton, Edguardo Torres of 
Framingham, and Adam Gomez of Springfield were absent at their city’s classification hearings and thus a 
voting record was not available. 
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single rate by 0.01 but not by 0.03 due to concerns surrounding the financial burden that 
such a move would place on the average homeowner in a single fiscal year. At the same 
time, a councilor in the City of Newton, which saw a larger amount of new growth in 
their commercial sector, might be more willing to move by 0.03 as the result on the 
individual homeowner will be significantly lower. Thus, for purposes of simplification, 
both councilors in this study would be coded at 1 for supporting a favorable outcome for 
commercial properties. 
If we were aware of every councilors ideal location on the CIP split scale for a 
given fiscal year, then a continuous dependent variable would be possible. However, with 
the data made available at this time, I am simply looking for the probability that a city 
councilor will take a pro-commercial stance on tax classification, given campaign 
contributions from likely business owners. This can be expressed as the following: 
 
In order to test the relationship between the dependent variable on campaign 
contributions as well as the other predictor variables, I implemented a logistical 
regression model outlined below. 
 
Equation 1 
Where p is equal to the probability of a councilor supporting a commercial friendly tax 
rate and Beta represents the predictor variables. In the above equation,  𝛽 1𝑋1 is equal 
to campaign contributions, 𝛽 2𝑋2 is equal to the change in CIP value, 𝛽 3𝑋3 is equal 
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to incumbency, and 𝛽 4𝑋4 is equal to At-Large races. From this model we can find the 
change in probability that we will arrive at a 1, a pro commercial vote, given a change in 
any of the independent variables. Logit or the similar probit models are a common tool 
utilized by scholars when studying the voting behavior of elected officials.14 
  
 
14 See (Segal, Cameron, and Cover, 1992; Welch, 1982; Stratman, 2002).  
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CHAPTER 4 
THEORY 
 The main question at the heart of this research is whether or not a strong 
correlation exists between campaign contributions and vote choice at the municipal level 
and if increasing contributions from business owners will significantly increase the 
likelihood that a city councilor will vote for a pro-business outcome. While this paper 
does not attempt to prove that there is a causal link, in both “vote-buying” and 
“ideological-sorting” theories, a correlational relationship should be expected when other 
factors are controlled for. An additional question is to what extent do city councilors in 
smaller municipalities depend on contributions from the business community? If past 
research conducted on cities truly is generalizable across municipalities and not limited to 
the large-scale elections of New York, Chicago, and other major cities, then we should 
also expect to find a high dependence on business contributions for funding these 
campaigns. Even through the machine model, businesses were responsible for 
contributing upwards of 40% or nearly half of all campaign contributions to candidates 
within their preferred group. We should expect to find a similar level of dependence 
amongst councilors in these cities as well.  
So, our two hypotheses going forward are; 1 that a strong correlation will exist 
between campaign contributions from likely business owners and an increased 
probability that councilors will vote for a commercially friendly tax rate, and 2 that city 
councilors should receive a majority of their funds from business owners. 
 A key assumption that this and other studies in this vein must inherently make and 
rely on is that the issue of tax classification is one that is of great importance to the 
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campaign contributors in question. Either because campaign contributions are expected to 
gain supportive votes on tax classification, as in vote-buying, or because businesses 
choose to support candidates who already hold such a position, as in ideological-sorting; 
either case depends on tax classification being a guiding factor for businesses to use. An 
additional assumption that was already discussed is that campaign donations increase the 
likelihood of electoral success. 
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CHAPTER 5 
RESULTS 
A. Frequentist Logit Model Results 
The percentage of contributions taken from likely business owners varied widely 
by both councilor and by community. In general, the results seemed to indicate that 
business owners were not necessarily the largest contributors to campaigns. A number of 
councilors had accepted no financial support from business owners while the most 
dependent councilor relied on them for 76.33% of their total contributions. While it was 
expected that most councilors would have similar results, the overall average was a mere 
18.13%. With a considerably large standard deviation of 12.31%, suggesting variation in 
dependence on business owners for campaign funding.  
 Interestingly, the average proportion of campaign contributions from business 
owners to councilors that opposed a lower tax rate for commercial properties was greater 
than the overall average at 18.43%. Strangely, city councilors that supported a pro 
commercial rate only averaged about 17.28%. These results do not suggest that 
councilors with pro-business positions are more dependent on the business community 
for contributions and if anything, imply the opposite. In real dollars, and adjusted for the 
number of years they served on the city council, the average city councilor that supported 
increasing commercial tax rates took in an average of $8,710.33 annually from businesses 
while those that opposed commercial tax increases averaged $2,902.26 a year. Those that 
gave preferential treatment to residents tripled the amount of donations annually from 
business owners. Though this may in part be a product of the tendency of councilors to 
vote together as a community, with some communities averaging substantially higher 
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contribution totals in general. For example, the Boston city council voted unanimously 
and without discussion to remain at the highest commercial tax rate allowable under 
Massachusetts Law. The City Councilors in Boston also collected the largest amount of 
money from businesses and overall, by a substantial amount, thus likely skewing results. 
This measure may be more indicative of the variation in the cost to campaign across city 
lines. Still, the results of the proportional analysis highlight reliable findings that directly 
contradict the expected outcome. 
Table 1. Logistic Regression Model Utilizing a Proportion of Campaign 
Contributions from Business Owners. 
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The table above clearly shows that none of the variables attain any level of 
statistical significance besides the change in CIP value. In FY 2019, the state average CIP 
percent of total value was 14.31% while the average for communities that split their tax 
rates had an average of 21.13% and communities with single rates had an average of 
11.20%. The average for the 14 communities in this study was 20.94%.  This wide 
discrepancy in proportion of property values coming from commercial entities suggests 
that a growing or shrinking commercial tax base is a strong indicator of where a 
community chooses to set its split. This makes sense, as communities that inherently 
attract commercial activity can force higher taxes on the business community which is 
willing to pay in exchange for operating in a profitable environment. Additionally, as one 
group of property parcels grows in value faster than the others, it automatically begins to 
pay a greater share of the tax burden. As a result, communities wishing to move on a tax 
rate must consider how much of an increased burden they will be placing on properties 
that have already increased in value. But even when this factor was controlled for in the 
equation, we fail to find a correlation between vote choice and campaign contributions. 
In response to this result, contribution data was divided into three separate 
variables to try to find evidence of a correlation. The first variable was proportional 
contribution which was shown above and discussed in methods. The second variable 
represented only campaign contributions made to city councilors between their last 
election and the vote on tax classification. In doing this, I hoped to limit any potential 
discrepancies that might have arisen from longtime councilors and newcomers. The logic 
here being that longtime councilors had been accepting contributions in some cases for 
over 20 years, while others had only done so in the last two years. By limiting all 
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councilors to the last election there was a clear start and end date for contributions to be 
collected. These contributions also represented those made to councilors most recently 
before their vote on tax classification. In this case, as Massachusetts Law requires all 
cities to hold their elections in November (Mass. Gen. Laws Chapter 43, § 126.), this 
means restricting contribution data from November of 2016 to November of 2018. 
Finally, the third variable only considered campaign contributions made to city 
councilors that were valued at over $200. These contributions were singled out for two 
reasons; the first being that they represent large contributions being made to individuals 
and the second being that when this large amount is given, contributors are required to 
disclose their occupation and employer. Even when substituting the main independent 
variable with several diverse measures of campaign contributions from businesses, there 
remained no observable relationship in the logit model results. The table associated with 
these additional logit models can be found labeled as tables 5 and 6 in the appendix. The 
results of the equations are similar to those in table 1 in that none of them achieved 
statistical significance. However, it may be worth noting that rather than the odd negative 
correlation found in table 1, both returned positive correlations.  
Of the three ways that business contributions were recorded, only donations over 
$200 averaged over 20% of contributions from business owners. From these it is clear 
that business owners made up a low proportion of contributions to city councilors in each 
city. Again, each variable displayed wide variation in how dependent councilors were on 
business contributions, even in the same voting blocs within the same cities.  
 In 2004 the Massachusetts legislature temporarily increased the amount that a 
municipality could raise their CIP Split to (Massachusetts Department of Revenue, 2004). 
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The Cities of Boston and Fall River were the only municipalities in the dataset to move to 
the new extreme that year. Since then, councilors in Fall River have maintained a level of 
fluidity with the rate while Boston has remained at or above the maximum allowed by 
law.15 In fact, since the Department of Local Services (DLS) began collecting data in 
2003, the City of Boston has never moved to lower commercial property taxes unless 
required to by law. It may be the case that cities like Boston, where the CIP Split is 
always set at the max, feel unable to pursue movement and so they focus elsewhere. 
Additionally, due to its size, business owners within the City may be focused on lobbying 
city councilors on other matters. 
A potential reason for the results shown above is that several of the selected cities 
have stayed at the maximum tax rate for commercial properties over the last several 
years. Not only have these cities stayed at the highest tax rate allowed by the 
Massachusetts Legislature, but most had very little discussion or attempts to move away 
from such a rate. As a result, businesses in these communities may be more accepting of 
the high tax rate and instead donate based on other factors. By quickly looking at the City 
of Worcester, where tax classification is always a contested topic, we can see the trends 
described above have reversed slightly. As can be seen from the heat map in the 
appendix, Worcester is unique in that it does not neighbor many other communities with 
split rates. In fact, Worcester neighbors only one community, Auburn, with a split rate. 
Worcester is the only city in this study in which this is the case. As such, the city is in a 
 
15 On certain occasions the City of Boston has requested that the Massachusetts Legislature allow it to 
increase the tax rate beyond the set maximum as part of MGL. 
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unique situation in which it must compete with neighboring communities to attract 
commercial enterprises.  
In Worcester, councilors that voted for a more pro-business tax rate, averaged 
$37,322 from the business community while those opposed averaged $18,752. Though, 
proportionally, councilors that opposed a pro-business rate relied more heavily on 
business donations, the difference was almost indistinguishable. Councilors that 
supported a commercially friendly rate had an average of 16.3% while those opposed 
averaged 17.1%. Worcester is not the only community selected that has moved on the tax 
rate. 
The table below shows the results of the regression model when cities that had no 
dissenting votes amongst city councilors and where the council unanimously decided to 
stay at the maximum tax rate allowed by law. By doing this, I hoped to remove cases 
where the chances of moving in a pro commercial direction were low enough that 
businesses in the municipality would not expect to see movement and would direct 
campaign funds to councilors with friendly policy positions outside of the tax rate. These 
cities were Boston, Lowell, Lynn, and Somerville, leaving the dataset with 10 cities and 
108 unique councilors.  
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Table 2. Logistic Regression Model with Dissenting Votes and Unanimous 
Decisions Removed. 
 
 
 The regression results are similar to those listed above. As originally determined 
by the previous method, no correlation between contributions and vote choice is found to 
be statistically significant. If we turn our attention to city councils as whole bodies, the 
average percentage of contributions to council members from business owners varied 
from Framingham’s low 5.03%16 to Lowell at 23.92%. The city with the second lowest 
 
16 Framingham’s abnormally low percentage of contributions from business owners is likely since it 
recently transitioned to a city form of government. Prior to 2018, Framingham was under a town meeting 
form of government with a population just under the 65,000-person threshold. When the city transitioned, 
56 
 
proportional average was Lynn, at 12.93%. It is worth noting again that Lowell was 
removed from the dataset used in the model above because of the unanimous decision by 
the city council to remain at the highest commercial property tax allowed by law. Despite 
this, the Lowell City Councilors had, on average, the greatest dependence on 
contributions from business owners.  
 It can be argued that these results are in part because the majority of these cities 
approved the first rate proposed with little discussion or debate. Dissenting opinions were 
quite rare in general (see table 7 in appendix). So, if we instead look more closely 
specifically at the cities in which councilors debated classification and took votes on 
multiple proposed rates, we should, in theory, see more of a result. The three cities in 
which multiple votes were taken were Springfield, Worcester, and Fall River. Between 
the cities there were four total pro-business votes which came from councilors in Fall 
River and Worcester. Of these four councilors, two had average proportions of their 
campaign contributions from businesses higher than their community’s averages while 
the other two were lower than their municipal averages.  
Recall that Springfield had a lone dissenter whose argument was that the rate did 
not go far enough. Springfield was unique in another situation as well as one Councilor 
voted with the majority to adopt the pro resident rate, however, that same councilor also 
made the original motion to adopt a pro commercial rate. This councilor did have a 
higher proportion of contributions from business than the community average. For a 
closer look at these councilors, see table 8 in the appendix. While the sample size is 
 
OCPF began collecting data on the city councilors, many of whom had been members of the select board 
when it existed. As a result, some campaign contribution data was skewed.  
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significantly smaller from looking so closely there is no indication that higher campaign 
contributions are indicators of pro-commercial votes.  
Table 3. Logistic Regression Model Utilizing Only City Councilors with the 
Greatest and Smallest Proportion of Contributions Coming from Business 
Owners. 
 
 
 The final logit model tested (displayed above) limits the dataset to the 20 
councilors that were most and 20 that were least dependent on campaign contributions 
from business owners. While there was no statistically significant finding from the 
previous models, it may be that councilors in the dataset that are most dependent on 
businesses to fund their campaign war chests are more likely to attempt to show their 
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friendliness to business friendly policies. At the same time, those that are financially 
independent from the business community may be more willing to vote against 
commercial interests. Though the table above does show that the Total Proportion 
variable is positive and thus moving in the theorized direction for a correlation, there 
remains no evidence that a strong correlation exists between campaign contributions and 
vote choice. Out of the 20 most dependent councilors, only 4 of them voted for a pro-
business tax rate while 7 of the 20 least dependent councilors voted for a business-
friendly rate.  
B. Bayesian Model 
 In addition to the frequentist models used above, I utilized a Bayesian statistical 
model to uncover a relationship that might have been too subtle to discover with a typical 
frequentist method. By utilizing a Bayesian model, we can find traces of a more subtle 
relationship that may not necessarily be obvious when relying on a p-value to determine 
statistical significance. This process began with a Bayesian binomial regression model, 
the Bayesian counterpart to a frequentist logit model.  
From here we can see the probability that any given councilor will vote for a pro 
commercial rate without factoring in any predictors. We find that the probability of 
voting for a pro commercial rate for any city councilor averages on .26 with an 89% 
confidence interval that it is between .21 and .32. So, already we can determine that 
amongst councilors in this dataset, the probability that any one of them will make a pro-
business vote is very low and instead have a tendency to favor residential properties. This 
is not too surprising considering the sample size consists of cities that have already 
adopted split tax rates above the state average and are already more likely to favor their 
largest constituency, residents.  
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Now that we have a base probability, we can incorporate our predictor variable 
and determine what the change in log odds that a City Councilor will vote for a pro-
commercial tax rate will be, given an 𝜒 increase in the percent of campaign contributions 
coming from businesses. However, rather than see an increase, we actually find a 
decrease of 10% in the odds that a councilor will vote for a pro-business tax rate when we 
increase campaign contributions from business owners. This also reflects a direct 
contradiction to the expected result.  
C. Switching the Dependent Variable to Incumbency 
 While not the focus of this research, it may be useful to examine the effects that 
the other predictor variables had on the contributions that councilors received. This is 
particularly true of incumbency, as previous studies have suggested that incumbents are 
better advantaged in raising money. In the following model, I switched the dependent 
variable to campaign contributions from members of the business community and 
implemented a multiple regression model to allow for a continuous independent variable. 
As previously stated, it is not clear if campaign contributions are caused by pro 
commercial votes or if pro commercial votes are caused by campaign contributions. 
Thus, the results from inverting the dependent and independent variables in this case is 
reasonable and is a legitimate subject of interest.  
Table 4. Multiple Regression Model Utilizing Incumbency as the Dependent 
Variable. 
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MULTINOMIAL (Figure 5.) 
The outcome of the regression model is shown in the figure above. The results 
indicate that only incumbency and at-large factors surpass the statistical significance 
threshold with p values less than .05. Recall that the leadership variable did not consider 
those that had previously served in leadership positions, but campaign contributions were 
tracked over the course of a councilor’s career. As a result, this variable may not be a 
completely accurate representation of how campaign contributors respond to those in 
leadership roles.  
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City councilors that ran in the previous elections, and thus were incumbents in the 
most recent election, averaged 19.95% of their campaign contributions from businesses. 
Those who were first time campaigners averaged 14.5% of their contributions from 
business owners. The overall mean for the variable was 18.63% In hard dollars, this 
discrepancy equals a difference of around $29,157 as incumbents took in an average of 
$40,195 from business owners while newcomers averaged only $11,037. These numbers 
may appear slightly distorted since campaign averages varied from community to 
community.  
Turning attention to at-large councilors versus ward councilors there is evidence 
of a similar pattern. Councilors at-large averaged 20.63% of their contributions from 
business owners while ward councilors averaged only 16.53%. This translates to $25,110 
for ward councilors and $40,860 for at-large councilors. The greater dependence on 
campaign contributions from at-large councilors may simply be from the fact that at-large 
councilors represent significantly more commercial properties than their ward 
counterparts who may represent majority residential neighborhoods. This simply gives at-
large councilors more opportunities to accept contributions from owners of commercial 
property.  
 These results are consistent with the findings of Fleischman and Stein who argued 
that campaign contributors followed an “investment” strategy when choosing who to 
support. It is important to note that this additional model was only meant to compliment 
the lack of findings in the logistic regression model with the previous dependent variable 
and not to prove the importance of incumbency. While the results appear to signify that 
incumbency is a strong predictor of receiving contributions from business owners, 
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candidates that did not win in 2018 were not considered and so the data that is used only 
represents successful city council elections. Furthermore, no conclusions are explicitly 
drawn from these findings in this study but rather this serves as evidence to suggest 
future studies should alter the questions being asked. 
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CHAPTER 6 
DISCUSSION 
 
 The results of the models from the previous chapter clearly indicate no discernible 
correlation between campaign contributions from business owners and a councilors 
support for movement on tax classification. In no configuration of the dataset did the 
relationship between campaign contributions and support for a pro-business rate achieve 
statistical significance. Even in a Bayesian model it could not be definitively determined 
if any relationship did exist if it was a positive or a negative one. In fact, some results 
even suggested that, overall, city councilors that opposed decreasing the tax rate for 
commercial properties were more dependent on members of the business community for 
necessary campaign funds. The Bayesian binomial regression model failed to 
conclusively determine the direction of any supposed correlation.  
Since there is no reason to believe that city councilors who oppose movement 
towards a single tax rate would be more successful in capturing the financial backing of 
the business community, we are left to draw two potential conclusions. The first being 
that the use of tax classification as a measure or the unfortunately skewed sampling of 
municipalities potentially blurred any observable link between campaign finance and vote 
choice or that these results have suggested that neither ideological sorting nor vote 
buying theories are applicable to elected officials in smaller municipalities. 
The results do, however, indicate that city councilors in smaller municipal 
governments do not heavily depend on campaign contributions from business owners. 
The averages seen in other much larger studies were clearly not observed in this case as, 
at the most liberal projection, City Councilors averaged a quarter of their campaign 
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contributions from business owners. This is nowhere near the 70% plus that was expected 
from past research at the municipal level.  
There are an unknown number of factors that have the potential to impact an 
individual official's vote on tax classification and where they believe the community as a 
whole should be. As with any model, only so many factors can be accounted for. This 
study was able to examine a handful of potential predictor variables. However, even 
when they were controlled for, we failed to find a statistically significant relationship. 
There are several reasons to believe that by utilizing the subject of tax classification, any 
potential correlation between campaign contributions and vote choice was masked.  
 While the selected cities here were relatively small when placed in the large 
framework of scholarly work on urban government, they represented the largest 
communities in Massachusetts. Since the Office of Campaign and Political Finance only 
collects data on councilors in Massachusetts cities with populations greater than 65,000 
residents, by definition, only campaign finance data on fairly large cities is centrally 
located. As previously discussed, these cities adopted higher commercial property tax 
rates than the average municipality. A wider sample size or a sample that included 
communities with a greater degree of volatility in selecting split rates may have been able 
to uncover a stronger relationship than the results found. Additionally, projected new 
growth for the coming fiscal year, strongly influenced city councilor’s votes. This is 
something that is outside of the control of the business community or city councilors.  
It is possible that lobbying for a lower tax rate may be of relatively low 
importance to the average business owner. While it would be in their financial interests to 
lower the tax rate, the cost of doing business in their chosen community has already been 
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factored into expenses. This may have been amplified in the selected communities as it 
can be argued that they were already more likely to have high commercial tax rates. As a 
result, business owners and members of the business community, assuming the split rate 
was already out of their control, may be looking at different factors when considering 
whose campaign to contribute to. Thus, while no strong relationship was found to exist 
on this issue, it may exist elsewhere.  
 The purpose of this research was not to suggest that the votes of municipal elected 
officials could be purchased, but rather if a correlation between contributions and vote 
choice, which has been found at the congressional level, exists amongst people in much 
lower offices. After all, if a link had been found it may only imply that campaign 
contributors are highly interested in selecting candidates with friendly positions on policy 
proposals. Nevertheless, if contributions did alter an official vote then there would have 
been some evidence of correlation.    
    With the possible limitations in mind, there are some legitimate and very 
important takeaways from the results. No matter how the data was configured or what 
method was applied, there was no discernable link between campaign contributions from 
likely business owners and a councilor’s vote on the split tax rate. This suggests that 
campaign contributions are completely ineffective at predicting the policy positions of 
elected officials at the municipal level.  
The fact that there was no discernible link tells us that contributions likely have 
little to no impact on how an official will vote. While the results should be taken with a 
grain of salt due to some of the complications described here, there remains simply not 
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enough evidence to suggest that any strong relationship exists between the vote choice of 
elected officials and that officials campaign contributions. 
 This evidence is in line with the traditional findings of political scientists only in 
part as the findings also tell us that contributors do not necessarily look for candidates 
with favorable policy positions. The lack of an observable relationship in this case not 
only runs contrary to the vote-buying hypothesis, but also to the ideological-sorting 
hypothesis. Instead, it appears that other factors such as incumbency may matter more 
heavily to campaign contributors. When the dependent variable was switched, the 
incumbency and at-large variables were the only statistically significant determinants of 
whether a city councilor would receive campaign contributions.  
 The results of the analysis also highlight that candidate’s dependency on 
campaign contributions from business owners is not nearly what has been suggested in 
studies of much larger municipalities. This was proven through multiple categorizations 
of the data involved and can have several implications that likely all have some degree of 
merit to them. 
 As stated earlier, Massachusetts as a state does not allow businesses as entities to 
contribute to campaigns. This may have severely limited the effective power of the 
business community in Massachusetts elections and in policy making. While individual 
business owners can contribute, as we have shown here, the forced use of personal funds 
may have effectively deterred business influence. If true, this is a finding that can have a 
significant impact on the future of campaign finance reform. This hypothesis could and 
should be further investigated either by comparing the effectiveness of the business 
community in securing preferred policy outcomes in other states and in Massachusetts, or 
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by taking an internal look at Massachusetts before and after the new restrictions were 
adopted.  
 Most of the research done on municipal levels has been, understandably, confined 
to very large cities due to a severe lack of centralized data. This study itself was hindered 
by such an obstacle. As a result, the majority of published scholarly work has found that 
large city elections are mostly funded through business and development interests. These 
cities, such as New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, as well as many others, have very large 
and influential commercial sectors. In addition to their large commercial sectors, these 
cities also have huge populations which translates to a greater number of potential voters. 
As a result, significantly more money must be spent on reaching out to these voters, 
whereas in a much smaller community, it is easier to gain prominence and familiarity 
with residents without substantial spending. So, while candidate Rudy Giuliani may have 
required sizable financial support from the business community to effectively reach the 
millions of residents of New York, Mayor Joseph Petty may be able to succeed with a 
fraction of the spending.  
This discrepancy between small and large cities was discernible even amongst the 
comparable cities in this Study. City Councilors in Boston were far more dependent on 
support from the business community to finance their campaigns than any of the other 
selected cities. These local candidates in smaller communities can secure more funding 
from their fellow residents and, as a result, have greater independence from business 
owners. This also explains the correlation found between business contributions and at 
large seats. Ward councilors are running for office in their respective neighborhoods 
where they likely already have name recognition and less need to spend large amounts of 
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money. City Councilors running at-large however, require more funding to reach 
residents throughout the city and thus turn to the business community to fill in the gaps.  
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
While it cannot be stated that no relationship exists between campaign 
contributions and vote choice about tax classification, any relationship that might exist is 
minor and not at the observable level that one might expect. This leads us to dismiss the 
applicability of the vote-buying and ideological-sorting hypothesis to smaller 
municipalities and instead turn our attention to other factors and councilor characteristics. 
Previous studies had suggested that city councilors campaign funds were 
incredibly dependent on contributions from business owners. Recall that studies had 
suggested that over 70% of contributions came from development and business interests. 
If this were true, city councilors would be relying almost entirely on the business 
community for the essential funds needed to run for office. Even when we look at the 
campaign averages by community, we fail to see the kind of dependence that was found 
to exist in very large cities in the smaller cities of Massachusetts.  
Though there may be several explanations for the absence of any correlation 
between contributions and vote choice, there remains reason to believe that when 
contributors choose to get involved, they follow an investment strategy rather than an 
ideological-sorting or vote-buying strategy. Both vote-buying and ideological-sorting 
theories, if occurring, are minor and not easily noticeable, nor are they at a level that 
should be cause for concern. Furthermore, the alleged dependence on development 
interests was not found in these smaller municipalities, suggesting that political scholars 
should continue to expand research in municipal campaign finance outside of the realm 
of mega-cities. While City Councilors in New York, Chicago, and other large cities may 
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rely heavily on large sums of campaign contributions in order to reach the many voters in 
their cities, City Councilors in smaller neighborhoods likely require less funding to get 
their name and message out. This lack of dependence on money in general leads to less 
funding and in turn dependence from the business community. This interpretation is 
further enforced by the financial backing of the business community to at-large 
candidates who must reach wider audiences. What’s more, the unexpectedly strong link 
between incumbency and business contributions should be further explored in smaller 
cities and municipalities. The evidence found here strongly suggests that factors relating 
to incumbency are significantly more likely to attract contributors than favorable votes on 
policy taken by elected officials. Instead of exploring whether contributions impact votes, 
future research will benefit by instead asking, what makes contributors want to support a 
candidate in a municipal election?  
Regarding real world applicability. The results of this study do not outright 
dismiss concerns surrounding campaign finance, but rather suggests that these fears may 
be misplaced. Campaign finance reform may not be effective in seeking to limit the 
amount of money candidates for public office can accept in an attempt to prevent their 
temptation to alter policy positions. Instead, reforms geared towards decreasing the cost 
of elections in general may better serve the purpose of limiting any influence of special 
interests.  
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CHAPTER 8 
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE STUDIES 
 A possible explanation for the lack of findings may be that this particular research 
design did not take into account political strategy utilized by individual councilors as it 
assumed, like studies at the congressional level, that councilor votes were made as 
rational choices and not through political strategies. Despite open meeting law, as 
discussed earlier, it may very well be the case that candidates wishing to move in one 
direction or the other, recognizing that they were in the minority, made a motion early to 
prevent the entire council from moving too far in the opposed direction. Tax 
classification is a unique subject, though it was coded as dichotomous, each councilor is 
choosing to support or oppose any number of points on a scale. Thus, a city councilor 
who supports moving to support businesses, may choose to back a motion that hurts 
commercial properties less so than another potential motion. Despite observing the 
meetings repeatedly, without a strong understanding of each individual councilor’s 
beliefs, their historic stances, or an interview with them, it is difficult to uncover if such a 
strategy has been utilized. 
The dominant if not only method of studies that have attempted to determine the 
influence of campaign contributions on policy outcomes, at all levels of government, has 
focused on a qualitative analysis of vote record. While this is indicative of where a policy 
maker stands on a issue, it does not give the observer the full picture of the individual 
legislator’s stance. While Bronars and Lott conducted telephone interviews and were able 
to gain some information from them, the bulk of their findings were from quantitative 
analysis of vote and contribution records. Reducing the complexities surrounding issues 
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as intricate as those voted on by legislators to a binary yea or nay vote can be 
problematic. There is no scale by which to measure how opposed or how supportive a 
legislator is of a policy proposal.   
An important piece of the narrative that is absent from this and many other studies 
examining the effects of campaign contributions on roll call voting is a qualitative aspect. 
While this may be significantly more difficult to do and almost impossible at the 
congressional level, there is reason to suspect such an approach may provide new insights 
into the effects of campaign contributions on roll call voting. A quantitative analysis that 
includes a qualitative portion such as discussions with campaign contributors and policy 
makers can be beneficial and further this area of study. This study could have uncovered 
potentially diverse and explanatory political strategies with regard to tax classification 
that a simple quantitative analysis was unable to do. At no level of government would 
such a study be easier to complete than at the local level where communicating with 
contributors and councilors is very easy. 
 The timing of campaign contributions has been discussed in some studies 
(Wright, 1990). In this study, campaign contributions were examined from the length of 
the elected official’s career, and the past two years, essentially from the last election. 
Though this study found no difference in results based on the timing of contributions, 
future studies that claim to find a relationship between campaign contributions and vote 
choice should seek to answer the question, does the contribution lead to the official’s 
vote, or does the vote lead to increased campaign contributions. This chicken and egg 
paradox is often assumed to be that contributions lead to changes in vote choice. This 
typical interpretation has led to most studies, such as this one, finding no evidence that 
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campaign contributions have any sway on the adoption of policy. By approaching this 
question from a different angle, scholars may find a new understanding of the role of 
money in our political system. 
Additionally, this research did not examine the margin of victory of any of these 
councilors in their last election. A city councilor with a high margin of victory has reason 
to believe that their ability to hold onto their elected office is relatively secure. As such, 
they may feel freer to vote according to their own personal ideologies rather than in 
accordance with those of their constituents or campaign contributors. Inversely, a 
counselor that has been engaged in a close election may feel more compelled to make 
decisions that they believe will help them fundraise in future elections or a counselor may 
instead choose to appeal to residential concerns. Within this same realm of unexplored 
predictors are the views and campaign contributions collected by councilor’s political 
challengers.17 
This is a variable that has been ignored in studies at the congressional level as 
well. There is an argument to be made that if elected officials feel particularly safe in 
their next election that they may be more willing to make riskier decisions (Sheffer, and 
Loewen, 2019), such as voting against the interest of their constituents or perhaps, voting 
against the interests of their major campaign contributors. Maybe an at-risk official will 
take a vote that they normally would not in order to appear more friendly to a potential 
 
17 In the case of the 2019 City Council election in Worcester, Councilor Matthew Wally who has routinely 
advocated for a single tax rate faced a challenger that stated they would only support a tax rate which was 
friendly to residents (Johnathan Honeycutt). Over the course of the election Honeycutt raised $650 to 
Wally’s $12,695. Though there are certainly other factors that play into a candidate’s ability to fundraise, 
this particular example highlights a direction outside the scope of this study and again suggests the overall 
importance of incumbency. 
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contributor for needed funds to secure re-election. Future studies should dig deeper into 
this line of study to determine if campaign contributions play more of a role for 
vulnerable officials.  
Several factors hindered this study and should be noted for future attempts to look 
more closely at the campaign contributions made to officials in municipal governments. 
Firstly, the office of campaign and political finance in Massachusetts does not have data 
centrally located on all municipal candidates. Due to time constraints, I was unable to 
perform a randomized sampling of communities across Massachusetts and collecting 
information directly from town clerks, which would have eliminated potential flaws in 
using data from communities that were already more likely to utilize split tax rates. This 
also would have eliminated any potential biases relating to the forms of government in 
communities that had adopted split rates. Additionally, the definitions used to identify 
business owners and or members of the business community, while I believe they were 
accurate and effective for the purposes herein, do not necessarily align with the typical 
definition of an interest group that we have seen at the congressional level. A preferred 
method would have been to directly compare contributors to members of the local 
Chamber of Commerce. As many Chambers of Commerce in Massachusetts argue for 
lowering the split rate and will often send representatives to classification hearings and 
request lower rates.18 Unfortunately, as these chambers are private organizations, their 
member lists are not always available to the public and this course had to be abandoned. 
 
18 Some communities in this study had chamber representatives come to their meetings while others did 
not.  
75 
 
This study examined only one meeting per city, however, as has been stated, tax 
classification must be voted on by every city annually. A future study with more 
available resources may benefit from a randomized sampling of councilor votes from 
several cities over a long period of time. Finally, as votes on tax classification are not 
necessarily dichotomous, but rather take place on a continuous scale, models outside of 
the standard logistic regression model. Though, the information about where a 
councilor’s ideal point might have to be obtained through interviews as city councilors 
may not elaborate on their intentions at meetings. 
Finally, additional predictor variables could have been incorporated to better the 
accuracy of results. While no causal impact has been found between fluctuations in 
cherry sheets and tax rate adoption, Massachusetts municipalities have been shown to 
replace lost state aid with increased property taxes. This leads to a higher overall burden 
on residents and may influence an official's vote. Additionally, changes made in 
surrounding communities may have some minimal impact on an official vote as well.  
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APPENDIX 
ADDITIONAL CHARTS AND TABLES AS WELL AS CHANGES MADE 
DURING THE CODING PROCESS. 
 
Figure 1. Average CIP Split by Fiscal Year. 
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Figure 2. Form of Governments and Split Tax Rates. 
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Table 5. Logistic Regression Model Utilizing Contributions over 200 Dollars. 
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Table 6. Contributions within the last election cycle 
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Figure 3. Heat map of split tax rates in Massachusetts municipalities 
 
*The map above displays communities in Massachusetts that have adopted split tax rates 
as of fiscal year 2018. As the difference between the two rates grows, the color of the 
community’s changes from green to red. Communities displayed in white did not adopt 
split rates in FY 18. 
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Table 6. City Averages and Summaries. 
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Table 7. Pro Commercial Councilors in Cities with Multiple Proposals. 
Municipality Business 
Proportion 
Proportion 
Between Elections 
Donations over  
$200.00 
Worcester (JP) *41.27% *25.73% 21.49% 
Worcester (KT) 13.22% 15.15% 13.22% 
Worcester (MW) 14.02% 14.48% 14.02% 
Fall River *20.48% 33.88% *20.58% 
Springfield* *20.14% *20.14% 20.14% 
* Starred averages indicate that the councilor numbers are higher than their respective 
city council averages. 
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Figure 4. Proportion of Contributions from Business Owners made to City 
councilors. 
 
*Frequency delineates the number of city councilors whose proportion of campaign 
contributions from businesses correspond with the x-axis.  
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Figure 5. Proportion of Contributions from The Business Community to City 
Councils as a Whole. 
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Figure 6. Change in CIP Value by Community from FY 18 to FY 19. 
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In several cases, the names of city councilors were written out multiple ways 
while referring to the same person. This likely happened in one of two ways. Either a 
candidate changed their name on their campaign finance reports to OCPF, by including a 
middle name, nickname, prefix, etc. or a typo occurred when OCPF entered the data. 
Every OCPF dataset was scanned for multiple names referring to the same individual 
using the delete duplicates function. 
 
Markey, William/Markey, William Brad/Markey, William B 
New Bedford 
The middle name Brad and initial B were removed so that every reference to the 
councilor read “Markey, William”. 
 
Rosen, Gary/Rosen, Gary 
Worcester 
While both names are spelled the same, the delete duplicates function returned two 
unique outputs revealing a space occasionally typed after Councilor Rosen’s name. These 
were changed to all read “Rosen, Gary” without a space. 
 
Essaibi George, Annissa/George, Anissa 
Boston  
The middle name Essaibi was removed and all spellings were changed to “George, 
Anissa”. 
 
Flynn, Edward M./Flynn, Edward Michael 
Boston 
Councilor Flynn’s middle name was shortened to M. for each occurrence so that it 
appeared in the dataset as “Flynn, Edward M.” 
 
Allen, Timothy/Allen, Timothy C.  
Springfield 
The middle initial C was removed, and all spellings were changed to “Allen, Timothy”. 
 
White Jr., William/WhiteJr. William 
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Somerville 
Similar to the situation with Gary Rosen, an extra space created an additional councilor.  
 
Giesta, Maria E./Giesta, Maria/Giesta, Maria Eugenia 
New Bedford 
All three names were changed to “Giesta, Maria”. 
 
DePeña, Brian/DePena, Brian 
Lawrence 
Depeña was changed to DePena for all occurrences. 
 
Laliberte-Lebeau, Pamela/Laliberte-Leabeau, Pamela 
Fall River 
In this case, there was a misspelling of councilor Laliberte’s name on OCPF records for a 
donation of $300. Only this one misspelling was found and corrected to “Laliberte-
Lebeau, Pamela”. 
 
Cadime, Shawn E./Cadime, Shawn 
Fall River 
The middle initial E was removed and all spellings were changed to “Cadime, Shawn:. 
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